How HAVE the policy preferences of Americans changed over the last four or five decades?' This question has two distinct facets we wish to address: (1) what substantive changes there have been, and (2) whether there have been gradual movements, sharp breaks or fluctuations, or general stability. In addition, we are concerned with whether the nature of change has varied across types of issues.
In the literature of public opinion, some scholars have maintained that opinions are highly labile, especially concerning foreign policy matters (Almond, 1950 ; but cf. Caspary, 1970). Such a view seems consistent with the notion that the average person is uninterested in politics, unaware of what is going on, and subject to influence by a host of arbitrary forces. Others have suggested that although the opinions of individuals may be volatile (Converse, 1964) , the aggregate distributions of preferences are generally quite stable and change slowly (Key, 1961; Erikson and Luttbeg, 1973; Monroe, 1975; Erikson et al., 1980) . Generalization has been hampered, however, by reliance on fragmentary or unsatisfactory data. Journalistic accounts have often stressed the instability of public opinion while reporting sudden jumps in the president's popularity rating or wild fluctuations in preelection polls.2 But these data do not gauge changes in polity preferences; the stimuli are not fixed policy alternatives but rather ever-changing politicians about whose latest words and actions new information is constantly available. When policy preferences are actually discussed, alleged fluctuations often represent only sampling error, or are artifacts of variations in question wording, sample design, or the research procedures followed by different polling organizations (see Lipset, 1976 ). The comparison of responses to even slightly different questions is hazardous; yet scholars have not generally had access to any comprehensive collection of responses to identical policy preference questions, asked repeatedly over time by the same survey organizations (see Cantril, 1951; Hastings and Southwick, 1975; Smith, 1980; Miller et al., 1980 , for helpful but limited collections).
Data
In connection with a study of dynamic relationships between public opinion and public policy in the United States (see Page and Shapiro, 1980), we have assembled an unusually large collection of data on Americans' policy preferences. In fact, we are attempting to collect the marginal frequencies of responses to all policy questions that have been asked of national samples by reputable survey organizations, in order to find every item that has been repeated with identical wording and to appraise how (if at all) responses have changed. In this paper we report results from a preliminary collection of 3,315 different policy items fielded during the period 1935-1979 by three organi-zations: the National Opinion Research Center (NORC), University of Chicago; the American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup); and the Survey Research Center/Center for Political Studies (SRC/CPS), University of Michigan. Amidst the mass of survey data we found 613 items which were asked with identical wordings at two or more points in time. 3 These 613 policy questions provide a substantial data base for analyzing change. To our knowledge they constitute the most extensive collection of opinion trends yet assembled; 327 (53 percent) of the questions concern domestic matters and 286 (47 percent) deal with foreign affairs or national defense. They address all types of policy activity (government spending, laws, regulations, actions of officials, outcomes) by all branches of government (executive, legislative, judicial), in a wide variety of policy areas.
Findings: The Extent of Change
The first question of interest is just how much change and how much stability are found in the data. To us, the striking finding is one of stability in Americans' policy preferences. We used the modest standard of a 6 percentage point shift in responses to constitute a significant change (a criterion corresponding to statistical significance at better than the .05 confidence level for multistage cluster samples of 1,500, with a 50-50 percent split in opinion), and also required that the level of change not depend on how "don't know" or "no opinion" responses were treated.4 Even by this rather generous measure, fully half of our repeated items-318 of the 613, or 52 percent-showed no significant change at all.
Moreover, most of the 355 changes that did occur (in the responses I We expect eventually to find more than 10,000 policy items, including perhaps 1,500 repeated questions. We would be most grateful for suggestions of sources we may have missed; please write to the authors at the National Opinion Research Center, 6030 South Ellis Avenue, Chicago, Illinois 60637; or telephone (area 312) 753-1300. 4 We defined an instance of opinion change as a shift in response frequencies of 6 percentage points or more between two repetitions (not necessarily adjacent) of a survey question, in which there is no significant (6 percent or more) intervening change in the opposite direction. To determine the size of each opinion change, we dichotomized the response categories in various ways to find the largest shift that occurred. For each case in which we obtained different estimates when we included or excluded the "don't know" or "no opinion" responses, we selected the smaller change. When questions contained three or more ordinal categories, our dichotomizing procedure in effect required that the balance of opinion change, that is, that opinion not merely polarize, with the extreme response categories changing in the same direction. We also raised the criterion to more than 6 percentage points for questions asked of small samples; to determine the amount of change required, we multiplied the standard errors for these small samples by 1.64, the adjustment factor that produces the 6 percentage points standard for samples of 1500.
to the 295 questions showing one or more changes) were rather small. Approximately half of them (161, or 45 percent) were less than 10 percentage points. Most of those involved preference changes of 7 or 8 percentage points-statistically significant but hardly earth-shaking.
Contrary to what one might expect, foreign policy items did not differ much from domestic in either the proportion or the magnitude of significant changes. As can be seen in Tables 1 and 2 , approximately half the items in each policy area showed change, and only a few more than half the changes in each area amounted to 10 percentage points or more. (It would be misleading, however, to conclude that foreign and domestic changes took exactly the same form. As we shall see, changes in foreign policy opinion tended to be more abrupt.) Examining more specific types of policy, we did observe some differences in the magnitude of change.5 Americans' preferences concerning civil liberties, abortion, Nixon and Watergate, and U.S.-China relations tended to change more than others, whereas on the average, preferences about social welfare policies and gun control changed less.
Although we have emphasized the stability of preferences, we also found some noteworthy instances of change. In fact, we found 42 cases (12 percent of the total) with changes of 20 percentage points or more. And 14 of these (to be sure, only 4 percent of all the cases of change) were of 30 points or more. In domestic affairs, for example, there were large increases in tolerance toward communists, socialists, and atheists. Opinion became much more favorable toward abortion, interracial marriage, desegregation of housing, and (by a hefty 38 percent)6 desegregation of schools; it moved heavily against We classified our instances of opinion change according to whether they were gradual, abrupt, or fluctuating. We called a change abrupt if it occurred at a rate of 10 percentage points or more per year. This criterion, of course, represents an arbitrary cutoff point in the continuous rate-of-change measure which we computed: it is as reasonable as any such dichotomy and includes as abrupt any significant (6 percent) changes that occurred within approximately seven months, along with bigger shifts that occurred more slowly. A fluctuation, in contrast, is defined by the number of reversals in direction of significant change within a given time interval. We took two or more 7 And presumably people with other disabilities as well. Although the questions concerning epileptics and national identification cards were asked in surveys which did not use strictly identical procedures, we are confident that the changes described are real. There are historical reasons to suppose that Americans' attitudes toward federal government social welfare programs underwent considerable change during the New Deal of the 1930s (see Schiltz, 1970; Cook, 1979) , but this has not been tracked by repeated survey questions. From the responses to individual survey items asked at various times since 1935 (mostly by Gallup) we have found support for such programs as Medicare and medical aid for the poor; the creation of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare; unemployment compensation; old age pensions and Social Security; antipoverty programs; food stamps; slum clearance and low-income housing; special assistance for mothers; and federal aid to education. But the repeated items show recent changes in a conservative direction concerning government spending on social welfare, health, the cities, and drug addiction, and concerning government provision of both jobs and a decent standard of living (see Davis, 1980; Smith, 1982) .
Contrary to assertions about a confused or vacillating citizenry, these gradual changes in opinions are understandable in terms of underlying secular changes. Americans became more willing to allow communists and socialists to retain basic civil liberties, as there came to be less reason to fear subversive activity. In addition, demographic changes, particularly the maturing of new and better-educated cohorts, contributed to greater social and political tolerance (see Stouffer, 1955; Davis, 1975 Davis, , 1980 Taylor, 1978) . In the area of civil rights, there was increased awareness of racial segregation and its consequences, and less belief that blacks were inferior. The civil rights movement undoubtedly contributed to consciousness raising, and Supreme Court action was a reflection of the change in the national mood-if not a cause then a consequence of it (see Taylor, 1978) . And in the case of abortion, technology had improved the safety of the procedure, while rubella, thalidomide, and other sources of birth defects made the public reconsider the complexities of the abortion question. In addition, unplanned pregnancy became more problematic for the increasing numbers of women who were working (see Karplus, 1980) .8
Our illustrations of gradual change have thus far all concerned domestic policy. This is no accident, for gradual shifts are more prevalent in domestic than in foreign policy areas. In fact, as shown in Table 3 Even the few fluctuations we observed did not necessarily represent unpredictable or irrational shifts in policy preferences. Some appear to be artifacts of question wording. Three of the domestic policy questions-whether taxes were too high, whether President Kennedy's policies should move to the left, whether President Johnson was pushing racial integration too fast-referred to current government activity at the moment of the interview, which could be quite different at different interviewing dates. The same applied to three foreign policy items asking whether the United States had gone too far concerning world affairs, whether people were making too many sacrifices for national defense, and whether the United States should be firmer with Russia. Changes in these responses somewhat resemble the public's volatile impressions of political figures or of the president's performance, where evaluations of personal qualities or actions change as new information about them is received. Here, too, the survey questions use shifting referents. Responses vary as the stimuli themselves change, even if underlying policy preferences remain constant.
In other cases of fluctuation, where policy preferences do actually change, it would still be wrong to assume that rapid shifts are random or irrational merely because they reverse direction. They may be reasonable responses to changing circumstances, as we shall see in examining the abrupt changes in opinion (including fluctuations) that have occurred during the last 45 years.
Abrupt Changes in Preferences
We found quite a few cases in which Americans' policy preferences changed abruptly, at the rate of at least 10 percentage points per year. Of our 355 instances of change 137 (39 percent) were abrupt.9 This is not an enormous number, particularly out of the 613 repeated policy items in our data set. Still, the rapidity of change in some cases is quite striking, especially concerning foreign policy matters.
The mean rate of change for all our foreign policy instances of change was 28 percentage points per year, compared to 7 percent for domestic cases (medians of 11 percent and 3 percent, respectively)-four times as rapid.10 Table 4 shows that 58 percent of 9 For this purpose (in contrast to the analysis of fluctuations) we can use the full set of instances of change, including some based on only two time points.
10 Our measure of rate of change is simply the number of percentage points in an instance of change divided by the number of years (or fraction of a year) within which it takes place. This generally gives a higher estimate, if there are more than two data points, than the regression of opinion on a time variable, e.g., in Schwartz (1967), Taylor (1980) , or Smith (1982). the changes on foreign policy, but only 21 percent of domestic, met our 10 percent per year criterion for abrupt change. One complication in making this comparison is that survey organizations have tended to repeat foreign policy questions at shorter time intervals than domestic, an average of 4.6 times per year versus 1.5. The high rate of change we found for foreign policy opinions could conceivably be an artifact of this, because abrupt changes are more likely to be detected when questions are asked frequently. Comparing domestic and foreign policy questions asked equally often, however, we still found more rapid changes in responses to the latter, particularly among questions asked several times per year. Survey organizations may well choose to ask questions about foreign affairs more often, precisely because they expect shifting responses to these items; thus the frequency of questions results from abruptness of change, rather than artificially creating it.
It should not be inferred that the many abrupt changes in foreign policy attitudes represent capricious shifts in the public "mood" (Almond, 1950) .11 On the contrary, virtually all the rapid shifts we found were related to political and economic circumstances or to significant events which sensible citizens would take into account. In particular, most abrupt foreign policy opinion changes took place in connection with wars, confrontations, or crises in which major changes in the actions of the United States or other nations quite naturally affected preferences about what policies to pursue.
Virtually all the shifts we observed in preferences concerning World War II were abrupt ones. Prior to America's entry into the war, support increased sharply for building a larger navy (late 1938) and for military and economic aid to the Allies (six questions, 1939-1941). Opinion became more favorable toward defending Canada if invaded (1939) (1940) (1941) , and opposition increased against sending war materials I" To be sure, Almond can be read as stressing that changes are rapid rather than capricious, but he suggests opinions will respond rapidly to a crisis and then continue to shift abruptly back and forth. He calls this reaction "a mood, a superficial and fluctuating response" (Almond, 1950:53) , which presumably cannot be explained any further.
to Japan. After the United States entered the war, the public became less concerned that Russia and China pay for their lend-lease assistance (early 1942). As the war progressed, preferences shifted about wartime goals and postwar issues; Americans showed increasing support for the destruction of Germany (1943) (1944) Because abrupt changes in preferences are intrinsically interesting and have been relatively neglected in the literature, we have devoted more attention to them than their number alone would warrant. It is well to remember that they are only exceptions to the general rule of gradual change or no change at all. But our main point here is that when preferences do shift rapidly, there is no reason to presume that the public is fickle, confused, or irrational; most abrupt changes have been associated with important objective events.
Conclusion
Our examination of the data indicates that there has been considerable stability in Americans' policy preferences. Half of our 613 re-peated items showed no significant change at all, and nearly half the significant changes we did find were modest in size-less than 10 percentage points. Most changes were gradual. Only rarely did preferences fluctuate back and forth to a statistically significant extent within a short period.
Moreover, when opinion changes did occur, they were not random or inexplicable; they were usually related to important changes in citizens' lives and in their social and economic environments. Abrupt shifts in preferences generally coincided with major events in international affairs or the economy.
To be sure, our discussion of the causes of opinion change is only intended to be suggestive, not definitive. A considerably more sophisticated analysis than just matching events and preference changes is required if we are to understand fully such important aspects of opinion dynamics as the impact of event stimuli, the role of the media, and the nature of time lags and diffusion processes (see Erbring, 1980; Erbring et al., 1980) . In particular, we do not wish to give the impression that public preferences are necessarily an autonomous engine of democracy, welling up from individuals' objective needs and external realities, and presenting themselves to politicians for action. Quite a different picture is also consistent with the data (and is hinted at in our discussion): a picture of public opinion, especially on foreign policy, as subject to leadership or manipulation by politicians, interest groups, and others-public opinion that is created or molded, as well as responded to. We intend to pursue these themes in the future.
For now, we would only emphasize that Americans' policy preferences have tended to move, when they have changed at all, in orderly and understandable ways. The evidence suggests that citizens may be more responsible than volatile. If this is so, students of democratic politics may want to reconsider the nature and political role of public opinion. Connections between citizens' preferences and the policymaking process seem eminently worthy of reexamination.
